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We develop a model of repeated product improvements in a continuum of sectors.  Each 
product  follows a  stochastic  progression  up a quality  ladder.  Progress  is  not uniform across 
sectors, so an equilibrium distribution  of qualities evolves over time.  But the rate of aggregate 
growth is constant.  The growth rate responds to profit incentives in the R&D sector.  We explore 
the welfare properties of our model.  Then we relate our approach to an alternative one that views 
product innovation as a process of generating an ever-expanding range of horizontally differenti- 
ated products.  Finally, we apply the model to issues of resource accumulation and international 
trade. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Casual observation suggests the central role that quality-upgrading plays in raising our 
standard of living.  For example, the ease and comfort of transportation have increased 
enormously  since  the  horse-and-buggy  gave  way  to  a  succession  of  automobiles  of 
ever-higher quality.  New  generations  of  televisions  provide  finer  detail  and sharper 
colours. And the enjoyment of music in the home has been enhanced by the replacement 
of the gramophone by the phonograph, and the phonograph by the compact disc player. 
Intermediate  goods too have  been  subject to  product improvement.  Witness the 
recent revolution in desk-top computing.  Or consider the advances that have taken place 
in  integrated  circuitry.  These innovations  have raised total  factor productivity  in the 
manufacturing of consumer goods and capital equipment, and made possible the produc- 
tion of entirely new final products. 
The economics of quality improvement have been studied by industrial organization 
economists in their work on patent races.  Beginning with  Loury (1979), Dasgupta and 
Stiglitz (1980), and Lee and Wilde (1980), much effort has been devoted to understanding 
the incentive that firms have to bring out new and improved products.  This literature 
typically views R&D competition as a once-and-for-all race for technological supremacy. 
While  contributing  many  useful  insights,  the one-shot framework fails  to  capture an 
essential aspect of quality competition.  This is the continual and cyclical nature of the 
process whereby each new product enjoys a limited run at the technological frontier, only 
to fade when still better products come along.  Almost every product exists on a quality 
ladder, with variants below, that may already have become obsolete, and others above, 
that have yet to be discovered. 
Recent work  by  Segerstrom  et  al. (1990) and Aghion and Howitt  (1990) provides 
the  beginnings  of  a  theory  of  repeated  quality  innovations.  These  authors  cast  the 
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patent-race paradigm in a dynamic, general-equilibrium setting.  The result in each case 
is a model of  long-run growth based on endogenous technical change.'  Their models 
enable us to study the structural and institutional determinants of ongoing technological 
progress. 
Each of these interesting efforts contains at least one unappealing element, however. 
In the work by Segerstrom  et al., patent races take place in a multitude of industries in 
sequence. That is, all research effort in the economy first is devoted to improving a single 
product, then another, and so on, until all products have been improved exactly once. 
Then the cycle repeats.  In Aghion and Howitt, by contrast, the patent race takes place 
at an  economy-wide level.  A successful  research  project  improves  all  products  simul- 
taneously.  The  sole  innovator thereby  gains  monopoly  power  across  all  industries. 
Evidently unhappy with this implication, Aghion and Howitt make reference to antitrust 
laws to justify  their imposition of  a requirement that the monopolist  must license the 
portfolio of patents to a continuum of arms-length competitors. 
In  what  follows,  we  propose  an  approach  that  resolves  these  difficulties.  This 
approach draws on the building blocks provided by  Segerstrom et al. and Aghion and 
Howitt.  We  envision  a  continuum  of  products,  each  with  its  own  quality  ladder. 
Entrepreneurs target individual products and race to bring out the next generation. These 
races take place simultaneously.  In any time interval, some of the efforts succeed while 
others fail.  Successful ventures call forth efforts aimed at still further improvement, with 
each innovation building upon the last. This specification accords well with the description 
of the research process in, for example, Freeman (1982) and Dosi (1988). 
Our model generates an equilibrium distribution of product qualities that evolves 
over time.  Each individual product follows a stochastic progression up the quality ladder. 
But, in the aggregate, the innovation process we describe is a smooth one.  An index of 
consumption grows at a constant and determinate rate in the steady state.  This rate is 
readily calculable.  It can also be compared to the socially optima1 rate of growth. 
We believe that our approach will prove useful in many applications.  In the latter 
part  of  this paper, for example,  we  explore  the  relationship  between  the  size  of  the 
resource  base and the long-run  rate  of  growth, and describe the long-run pattern  of 
specialization in a two-country world economy with innovation and trade.2 In Grossman 
and Helpman  (1991), we  study the product  life-cycle with  concurrent  innovation  by 
high-wage producers and imitation by low-wage producers.  Grossman (1989) derives the 
growth effects of a variety of trade and industrial policies. 
Our approach is related to an alternative one that views product innovation  as a 
process  of generating an ever-expanding range of horizontally differentiated products." 
This latter framework has been  applied to positive  and normative topics in economic 
growth  in  recent  work  by  Judd (1985), Romer  (1990) and ourselves  (Grossman and 
Helpman, 1989a, b, c, 1990). At first glance, the economics of the development of horizon- 
tally differentiated products seem quite distinct from those of product improvement. Yet, 
as we shall demonstrate below, the two approaches yield quite similar answers to many 
1.  Related work by Schleifer (1986) and Krugman (1990) deals with a continual process of cost innovation. 
Reductions in cost and improvements in quality are two different ways for firms to supply more services at a 
given  price. 
2.  Grossman  (1989)  relates this two-country  model  to the evidence on Japanese success in  the high- 
technology sectors. 
3.  Scherer (1980, p. 409) cites survey evidence that firms devote 59% of their research outlays to product 
improvement, 28% to developing new products and 13% to developing new processes.  These data may understate 
the importance of  vertical  relative  to horizontal  differentiation in the innovation process, since many  "new 
products"  replace old products that perform similar functions. 45  GROSSMAN  &  HELPMAN  QUALITY  LADDERS 
questions.  Indeed, it  is possible to construct comparable variants  from each class of 
model that share identical reduced forms.  The alternative analyses do diverge, however, 
when it comes to normative issues. 
The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  We  develop  our simplest 
one-factor model of growth due to quality improvements in the next section and explore 
its positive and normative properties in Section 111.  In Section IV we pursue the analogy 
between quality-based growth and variety-based growth.  Section V extends the model to 
include an outside good and a second primary input, and investigates the implications 
of factor accumulation for growth.  In Section VI  we introduce a second country and 
international trade, and describe the long-run pattern of trade.  Section VII concludes. 
11.  THE BASIC  MODEL 
We consider an economy with a continuum of goods indexed by  w. The (fixed) set of 
goods consists of the interval [O, I] whose measure is one.  Each product w can potentially 
be supplied in  a  countably-infinite number of  qualities.  We  choose units so that the 
quality of every good at time t =0 equals one. Quality j of product w is given by qj(w)=A!, 
where  A > 1 is the same for every  w.  In order to attain  quality j,  a product  must  be 
improved j times after t =0. Each step up the quality ladder requires R&D.  We describe 
this activity below. 
Consumers share a common intertemporal utility function 
U = 1;  eppllog u(t)dt, 
where p is a subjective discount rate and log u(t)represents the flow of utility at time t. 
Instantaneous utility is given by 
log u(t)=  log LC, q,(w)dj,(w)]dw, I,' 

where dj,(o) denotes consumption of quality j of product w at time t.  Every consumer 
maximizes utility subject to an intertemporal budget constraint 
where E(t)represents the flow of spending at time t, R(t)  is the cumulative interest factor 
up to time t, and A(0)denotes the present value of the stream of factor incomes plus the 
value of initial asset holdings at t =0. Naturally, 
where pjt(w)is the price of quality j of product w at time t. 
The consumer maximizes utility in two stages.  First, he allocates E(r)to maximize 
u(t)given prices at time t.  Then he chooses the time pattern of spending to maximize 
U. To solve the static problem, the consumer selects for each product the single quality 
j =  Then  he  allots  J,(w) that  carries the  lowest  quality-adjusted  price  p,,(~)/q,(w).~ 
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identical expenditure shares to all products.  This gives static demand functions 
E(t)lp,,(w) 	 forj  =Jl(w), 
otherwise. 
Substituting these demand functions into (2),and the result into (I),  we can reformu- 
late the  intertemporal  maximization  problem  as one of  choosing  the time  pattern  of 
spending to maximize 
subject to (3), where q,(w) and p,(w) represent the quality level and price, respectively, 
of J,(w). The solution to this problem is characterized by 
the budget constraint (3), and a transversality condition. Since preferences are homothetic, 
aggregate demands are proportional to those of the representative  consumer.  In what 
follows, we  use  E  to denote aggregate  spending and (5) to  represent  economy-wide 
demand functions. 
Turning to the production side, we endow the economy with a single primary input 
called "labour"  (but see Sections 5 and 6).  One unit of labour is needed to manufacture 
one unit of any product, regardless of quality.  Of course, better quality products cannot 
be produced until they have been invented in the research lab.  Patent restrictions may 
apply as well, as we shall discuss further below. 
At any point in time producers in any "industry"  w compete as price-setting oligopol- 
ist~  with common marginal costs equal to the wage rate  w(t). Then, if  several firms in 
an industry are able to produce goods of the same quality, each sets a price equal to unit 
cost in the Bertrand competition and each earns zero profit.  Alternatively, one producer 
may enjoy a quality lead over its industry rivals.  Then the oligopoly equilibrium entails 
the leader charging a price that, adjusted for quality, falls epsilon below the unit cost of 
production of its nearest competitor, while that competitor sets a price just  equal to its 
own marginal cost.  At these prices the leader captures the entire industry market.  The 
leader would  not wish to deviate from this equilibrium  by  raising  price discretely, for 
then it would lose all of its customers to its rival.  Nor would it wish to reduce the price, 
because industry demand functions are unit elastic.  The rival, for its part, can only make 
losses by  lowering its  price  below  marginal  cost, while  higher  prices  are a matter  of 
indifference when sales are zero. 
Our  assumptions  on the  technology  of  product  development and  the  nature  of 
intellectual property rights will ensure that every industry has a unique quality leader. 
Also, we will show that, in each industry, the leader always stands exactly one step ahead 
of its nearest rival.  Then all state-of-the-art products bear the same "limit"  price, 
This price yields demand per product of EIAw.  The leaders each earn a flow of profits 
n-=(Aw- w)E/Aw = (1-1lA)E. 
A blueprint is needed to produce any commodity.  These blueprints are costly to 
develop.  We assume that infinitely-lived patents protect the intellectual property rights 
of  innovators, and that patent licensing is not feasible.  These assumptions ensure that 
all manufacturing is undertaken by firms that have successfully developed new, state-of- 
the-art products.  Alternatively, we  might assume an absence of enforceable patents, but GROSSMAN  &  HELPMAN  QUALITY  LADDERS 
also that imitation is costly.  No firm would invest in imitation knowing that it  would 
earn zero profits in the ensuing Bertrand eq~ilibrium.~  Similarly, we could suppose that 
licensing is feasible, but that the antitrust laws prohibit no-competition clauses in licensing 
contracts, or that such covenants are difficult to enforce.  No firm would pay a positive 
amount  for a  blueprint  if  the  licensor  were  unable to  commit  itself  to refrain  from 
subsequent entry into Bertrand ~om~etition.~ 
An entrepreneur may target her research efforts at any of the continuum of state-of-the- 
art products. If she undertakes R&D at intensity II for a time interval of length df,  then 
she will succeed in taking the next step up the quality ladder for the targeted product 
with probability  idt. This formulation mimics the one-shot, partial equilibrium, patent- 
race models of Lee and Wilde (1980) and others.  It implies that R&D success bears a 
Poisson  probability distribution  with  an arrival rate that depends only on the current 
level of R&D activity. 
We allow free entry into the race for the next generation product.  A unit of R&D 
activity  requires  a, units  of  labour per  unit  of  time  for both  an incumbent  and for 
newcomers.  That is, we implicitly suppose that potential entrants can, via inspection of 
the goods on the market, learn enough about the state of knowledge to mount their own 
research efforts, even if  the patent laws (or the lack of complete knowledge about best 
production methods) prevent them from manufacturing the current generation products. 
This  specification  captures  in  part  the  often  noted,  public-good  characteristics  of 
technology. 
Without  any cost  advantage,  industry leaders do not invest  resources  to improve 
their own state-of-the-art products.'  To see this, note that a research success would leave 
the leader with a two-step advantage over its nearest competitor, and thus enable it to 
increase its price to A~W.  = This would yield a flow of  incremental  profits equal to AT 
(1-l/h2)~  l/A)E = (1-l/A)E/A, which, however, is strictly less than the incre-  -(I-
mental profits (1 -l/A)E that accrue to a non-leader who achieves a research success. 
So leaders  seeking to upgrade the quality of  their  own products cannot successfully 
compete for financing with non-leaders.  Put differently, a leader would strictly prefer to 
devote any research funds it may raise to R&D aimed at developing a leadership position 
in a second market rather than to R&D aimed at widening an existing lead in its own 
market. 
We  consider  now  the entrepreneur's  choice of  industry  in  which  to target  R&D 
efforts, and the optimal scale of those efforts.  The prize for a research success in some 
industry is a flow of profits that will last until the next success is achieved in the same 
industry. We have seen that the profit flows T are the same for all industries w. Therefore, 
an entrepreneur will be indifferent as to the industry in which she devotes her R&D efforts 
provided that she expects her prospective leadership position to last equally long in each 
one.  We focus hereafter on the symmetric equilibrium in which all products are targeted 
5.  In Grossman and Helpman (1991), we develop a two-country model in which factor prices differ across 
countries.  Then imitation may be profitable in the low-wage country, because success in creating a clone yields 
strictly positive profits to the imitator in the ensuing duopoly equilibrium. 
6.  As a referee has pointed out to us, if  licensing were feasible and contracts unrestricted, an innovator 
would always prefer to license her new technology to the nearest rival  rather than to compete with that rival 
in the product market. 
7.  This is essentially the same result as in  Reinganum (1982). She shows that a challenger has greater 
incentive to undertake risky R&D than an incumbent, in a one-shot patent race.  Here, leaders do not undertake 
R&D at all, because the supply of challengers is perfectly elastic.  In Grossman and Helpman (1991) we assume 
that  leaders,  by  dint of their  past  R&D successes, are able to improve  upon  their  own products at lower 
(expected) cost than outsiders.  With this modification of the model, we find equilibria with positive  R&D by 
both leaders and challengers. 48  REVIEW  OF ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
to the same aggregate extent L. In such an equilibrium the individual entrepreneur indeed 
expects profit flows of  equal duration in every  industry and so is  indifferent as to the 
choice of industry. 
We let  u  denote the present value of the uncertain profit stream that accrues to an 
industry leader; i.e. the stock market value of the firm.  In a moment, we will relate  u  to 
the size of oligopoly profits, the expected duration of industry leadership, and the market 
rate of interest.  But for the moment, it is enough to recognize that  u is the size of the 
prize for a research  success.  An individual entrepreneur can realize u with probability 
idt by investing resources  a,;  in R&D for an interval  dt at cost wa,2t.  This venture is 
risky,  because the R&D effort  may  fail.  But  the risk  involved is idiosyncratic,  so the 
market will  encourage entrepreneurs to maximize the expected net benefit  from  R&D. 
Maximizing  uidt -wa,litt, we  find that either the optimal scale of  operation is zero or 
infinite, or expected benefit is zero for all  i.  In an equilibrium with positive but finite 
investment  in  R&D,  we  must have  u = wa,.  As in models of  perfect  competition with 
constant returns to scale, the size of the individual R&D venture here is indeterminate. 
We  turn now to the stock-market valuation  of  the firm.  The ownership shares in 
industry leaders pay dividends ~dt  over a time interval of length dt, and appreciate by 
zjdt  if no entrepreneur succeeds in supplanting the firm's leadership position.  However, 
if the leader's product is improved during the interval dt, the shareholders will suffer a 
total capital loss of amount u.  This happens with probability ~dt,  where we recall that  L 
is the aggregate intensity  of  research by the (perhaps) many entrepreneurs who target 
their R&D efforts at the leader's product.  All told, the shares bear an expected rate of 
return of (T  + d)/u - L  per unit time.  This return is risky.  But once again the risk for any 
one leader is idiosyncratic. The stock market values the firm so that its expected rate of 
return just equals the safe interest rate R.  Using u = wa,, we may write this "no-arbitrage" 
condition ass 
T w .
-+-=R+L. 
wa,  w 
We  choose labour as numeraire; i.e.  w(t) = 1 for all  t.  Recall that T =(1-l/A) E. 
This, together with (7) and the no-arbitrage condition, implies 
This provides a differential equation for spending. The rate of growth in spending increases 
with the level of spending and decreases with aggregate R&D intensity. 
We  close the model with a market-clearing condition.  Let L be the total supply of 
labour.  Total manufacturing employment equals9 
8.  If we solve the differential equation implicit in the no-arbitrage condition, we find that this condition 
equates the cost of  R&D to the expected  present  discounted value of  profits;  i.e. it  requires the absence of 
excess profits.  This requirement  follows of  course from our assumption  of free entry into  R&D.  We  could 
have specified the no-excess profits condition directly, as we did in Grossman and Helpman (1989a),  and then 
derived the no-arbitrage condition by differentiating with respect  to time. 
9.  We assume here that even at time  r =0 each industry has a unique leader plus a competitor one rung 
down the quality ladder. This implies that p =  A  for all products.  We will show that, with this assumption, the 
economy jumps immediately to the steady state.  Alternatively, we might start the economy with a universally 
known backstop technology for quality q, of each good. Then the steady state that we describe is approached 
in the limit, after all goods have been improved for the first time. GROSSMAN  &  HELPMAN  QUALITY  LADDERS  49 
while the R&D sector empoloys arb workers. Therefore, equilibrium in the labour market 
requires 
The  differential  equation  (9) together  with  the  side  condition  (10) describe  the 
evolution of our economy for every initial value of spending E.  We depict the dynamics 
in Figure 1, where LL represents the resource constraint (lo),and IIII describes combina- 
tions of E and L  such that E =0; i.e. 
The economy must always lie along LL, with spending rising above IIII and falling below 
this line.  For any initial value of E below that labelled  E, spending eventually falls to 
zero,  a  violation  of  the  transversality  condition.  For initial  values  of  E  above  I?,  L 
approaches zero at a point where the level of spending implies expected profits in excess 
of  R&D costs.  This event would contradict profit  maximization by entrepreneurs.  We 
conclude that the economy must jump immediately to the steady state at point A.  The 
equilibrium values of E and L  solve (10) and (11). 
In the dynamic equilibrium, each product is improved with probability ~dt in a time 
interval  of  length  dt.  By  the  law  of  large  numbers,  a fraction  L  of  the products  are 
continually being improved. These will not be the same products in every "period",  nor 
will  technological  progress be  uniform  across sectors.  In  fact, our model predicts  an 
evolving distribution of product qualities, with individual products constantly swapping 
relative positions within that distribution. 
Before we proceed to investigate the market determinants of R&D and the welfare 
properties of the equilibrium, it is worthwhile to point out an alternative interpretation 50  REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 
of our model.  This interpretation treats each good w as an intermediate input into the 
production of a single final consumer good. Then (2) gives the constant-returns-to-scale 
(Cobb-Douglas)  production  function for the final good, and u represents the flow  of 
final output.  The consumer's utility function remains as in (I), but now u there stands 
for the consumption of the single final good.  This good is priced at marginal cost in a 
competitive equilibrium; i.e. 
r 
This provides a natural interpretation of (6) as the discounted value of the logarithm of 
real spending Elp,,. 
From this point on the analysis proceeds as before to arrive at the differential equation 
(9) and the resource constraint (10). With this new interpretation, technological progress 
entails improvement in intermediate inputs, which serves to raise total factor productivity 
in  the manufacture of consumer goods.  It would be  a simple matter to  augment the 
model to include direct use of primary factors in the production of final goods, in which 
case we  would have a specification similar in many respects to Romer (1990).  We  shall 
pursue this analogy further in Section IV below. 
111.  EQUILIBRIUM AND OPTIMAL GROWTH 
We  define the growth rate g to be the rate of increase of  u.  With the interpretation of 
the w's  as intermediate goods, g represents the rate of growth of final output.  With our 
original interpretation of the w's as consumer goods, g corresponds to the rate of increase 
in a quality-adjusted consumption index. 
To calculate g, we substitute (5) and (8) into (2) to derive 
log u(t)  =log E -log  A + I"'
log q,(w)dw. 
The last term  depends upon i  and  t.  For any given  w,  the probability  of  exactly  m 
improvements in a time interval of length  T  is (see Feller (1968), p. 159) 
Since in equilibrium the same intensity of R&D applies to all products, f(m, 7)represents 
the measure of products that are improved exactly m times over an interval of length  T. 
Therefore, 
r  I 
The right-hand side equals the product of log A  and the expected number of improvements 
in an interval of length  t.  This product equals it log A.  Hence, 
log u(t)=log E -log  A +it log A,  (12) 
and the growth rate g =  L log A. 
We  are  now  prepared  to  study  the  determinants  of  the  growth  rate.  We  solve 
(10) and (1  1) to derive the following reduced-form expression for i: GROSSMAN &  HELPMAN  QUALITY  LADDERS  5  1 
This equation or Figure  1 czn be used to examine the comparative statics.  In terms of 
the figure, an increase in L shifts the LL curve out and so increases equilibrium L. Thus, 
as in Romer  (1990), Aghion and Howitt  (1990) and elsewhere, a larger resource base 
implies faster growth (but see Section V below).  Similarly, a decline in a, shifts LL out 
and also shifts IIII down.  R&D effort expands due both to a resources effect and an 
incentive effect.  The same is true about an increase in A  which not only raises  L  but also 
spurs growth  directly,  because  the  technology jumps  become  larger.  In  short,  R&D 
responds to profitability incentives and the economy exhibits dynamic increasing returns 
to scale. 
We turn now to issues of welfare.  Using (I), (12), and the knowledge that E and L 
are constant in equilibrium, we can calculate the following exact expression for U: 
pU  =log E -log  A +(LIP)  log A.  (14) 
This representation of lifetime utility induces a preference ordering on E and L  that can 
be depicted by well-behaved indifference curves such as UU in Figure 1. Greater spending 
means higher utility  early on, which may  compensate for fewer quality improvements 
and hence lower utility later. 
We find the optimal growth rate by maximizing (14) subject to (lo)."  This gives the 
optimal intensity of innovation 
L  P 
a,  log A' 
L+-----
which  we  find in Figure  1 at the tangency of  an indifference  curve and the resource 
constraint LL. 
We discuss the possible discrepancies between the optimal and equilibrium growth 
rates with the aid of  Figure 2.  In the figure, we have plotted the curve for A/(A -1). 
This must not exceed Llpa, +  1 if we are to have positive growth in equilibrium (compare 
the vertical intercepts of  LL and TIII  in Figure 1). Hence,  L =0 for A 5 A,  and L >0 for 
A >  A,.  Next, we compute from (13) and (15) 
Figure 2 also shows the curve for Allog A.  As is clear from the figure, L > L*  for A  E (A,,, A,) 
and A >  A,,  whereas  L <  L*  for  A  E (A,,  A2).  In other words,  the market incentives for 
R&D are excessive in our economy when the steps of the quality ladder are quite small 
or quite large, but are insufficient for steps of intermediate size. 
This finding can be understood  with  reference to the market distortions identified 
by  Aghion  and Howitt.  First, successful innovators generate a positive  externality  for 
consumers. Consumers pay the same price as before the innovation but receive a product 
of higher quality. This externality certainly lasts as long as the innovator maintains her 
monopoly position.  Actually, it lasts indefinitely into the future, since all later innovations 
improve upon a product that is  one step higher up the quality  ladder than otherwise. 
10.  In a model with  more than two activities, such as that in Section V,  we would  need to distinguish 
between  the second-best growth rate which takes the oligopoly pricing of innovation products as given, and 
the first-best rate that sets all prices equal to marginal cost (see Grossman and Helpman, 1989b3.  To achieve 
the first best we would generally require two policy instruments, one to correct for externalities generated in 
R&D and the other to ensure optimal output of the innovative products. However, with all manufactured goods 
priced  similarly and with  labour supplied inelastically, the problem  of optimal  resource allocation becomes 
simply one of determining whether the resources devoted to R&D in the market equilibrium are too many or 
too few. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 

This externality, which combines what we shall call a consumer-surplus effect (during the 
life of the new product) and what Aghion and Howitt term an intertemporal spillover efSect 
(extending over the lives of  later products), measures (log A)/p in terms of the utility 
metric in (1) and (2). 
Second, a successful innovator generates a negative externality for extant industry 
leaders.  In effect, the innovator "destroys"  the producer surplus of the firm it displaces. 
Aghion and Howitt term this the business-stealing effect. This adverse effect is compounded 
by a multiplier, as the loss of income suffered by owners of the displaced firm means less 
demand and less profits for all remaining industry leaders.  In all, the innovation causes 
instantaneous profits of others to fall by  A -1. This flow must be discounted at rate L +p, 
the effective discount rate for profits, which takes into account the expected rate of arrival 
of the next innovation in each industry.  So the total negative externality imposed by the 
innovator equals (A -1)/(~ +p).  For low or high values of A  the adverse effect is larger, 
while the combined consumer-surplus and intertemporal-spillover effects dominate when 
A  takes on an intermediate value." 
The optimal growth rate is more likely to exceed the equilibrium rate when Lla, is 
large; i.e. in large economies as measured in units of (R&D) efficiency labour.  Then the 
optimal rate of innovation is great.  Larger values of  L*  reduce the size of the business- 
stealing effect per unit output without changing the size of the consumer-surplus effect 
per unit output. 
The optimum can be decentralized here by means of a tax or subsidy on R&D outlays. 
Let  T be the multiple (or fraction) of R&D costs borne by the firm, with  T > 1 for a tax 
and T<  1 for a subsidy.  With such a policy in effect the no-arbitrage condition (11) is 
replaced  by  one with the left-hand side divided by  T.  An  increase in  T shifts the l7l-I 
curve upward in Figure 1 and so generates an equilibrium with greater spending and less 
11.  Using  the  expression  for  L  in  (13), it  is  easy  to  show  that  the  difference  between  the combined 
consumer-surplus and intertemporal spillover effects and the business-stealing effect has the same sign as the 
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innovation. A decrease in  T has the opposite effects on resource allocation.  By  varying 
T,the government can achieve any point along LL, including of course the optimum. 
IV.  QUALITY  VERSUS  VARIETY 
We  have  followed  Segerstrom  et  al.  and Aghion  and  Howitt  in  treating endogenous 
product improvements as the engine of growth.  As  we  noted  in the introduction, this 
approach  to technological  progress  differs  from  the one pursued  in  recent  papers  by 
Romer and ourselves (1989a,b,  1990).12 This work treats technology-based growth as a 
process of generating an ever-expanding variety of horizontally differentiated products. 
In this section, we develop a simple variant of a variety-based growth model to demonstrate 
a remarkable similarity between the alternative approaches. In particular, we show below 
that the variety-based growth model and the quality-based growth models have identical 
reduced forms and we discuss the analogous roles that different parameters play in each 
formulation. 
We continue to represent consumer preferences by (1).  Now, however, the consump- 
tion index u(t)exhibits love of variety over an infinite set of horizontally differentiated 
products, as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). We  replace (2)by 
l/a 
u(t)=  [  ~  ~  d,(w)"dw] ( "  ,  O< a <  1,  (17) 
where n(t)  denotes the measure of differentiated products available at time t and d,(w) 
represents consumption of brand w at time t.  In this case too the differentiated products 
can be interpreted either as final consumer goods or as intermediate inputs.  Under the 
latter  interpretation,  (17) represents  a  production  function  and  u  is  output  of  a 
homogeneous consumer good (see Ethier (1982)).We shall not dwell on the intermediate 
goods interpretation in order to save space. 
This preference structure implies an intertemporal allocation of spending given by 
(7)  and well-known  static demand functions that exhibit a constant  price elasticity of 
demand of 1/(1-a)  > 1 and a unitary expenditure elasticity of demand for each variety 
(see, for example, Grossman and Helpman (1989~)). We assume that a unit of any brand 
can be produced with one unit of labour, with labour again being the sole primary input. 
In this case,  marginal  production  cost equals the wage  rate  w  and oligopolistic price 
competition among suppliers of available varieties implies mark-up pricing, or 
for every product at each point in time.  This equation is  analogous to (8). It implies 
that profits per brand are .ir = (1-a)E/n,  where E  is total spending. 
Entrepreneurs must devote resources to R&D in order to bring out new products.'" 
Product development requires a,/K  units of labour per increment to the set of varieties, 
where  K  is the stock of  knowledge  capital at a point in  time.  Knowledge  capital is a 
public good; it is freely available to all potential innovators. Moreover, knowledge capital 
is generated as a by-product of product deve~o~ment.'~  For simplicity, let K = n.  Then 
product development costs are c, = wa,/  n.  We assume that the developer of a new variety 
maintains indefinite monopoly power in the sub-market for her specific brand. 
12.  See  also Judd  (1985),  who studies the introduction of  new  products via  R&D, but  in  a dynamic 
framework in which growth  ceases in the long run. 
13.  Or, more precisely, resources are spent to expand the measure of the set of available products by  dn. 
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Free entry by entrepreneurs ensures that, whenever innovation takes place, the present 
value of the infinite stream of future profits exactly matches the cost of product develop- 
ment.  The time-derivative of this zero-profit condition gives the following no-arbitrage 
condition: 
This  condition  equates  the  interest  rate  to  the  instantaneous  profit  rate,  TIC,= 
(1-a)E/  wa,,  plus the rate of capital gain, i.,/c,  = w/ w -ri/n. 
We  again  choose labour as numeraire;  i.e.  w(t)= 1  for all  t.  Let  y= riln be the 
growth rate of the number of varieties. Then, using (7), we can re-express the no-arbitrage 
condition as 
which is analogous to (9)above.  Here a, plays the role of a, and y  plays the role of  L; 
the latter analogy will become clearer from what follows. 
Total demand for labour is the sum of employment in R&D, (a,/n)ri,  and that in 
manufacturing, n(E/  np)  = LYE.Thus, labour-market clearing implies 
which is analogous to (10).The differential equation (19)together with the side condition 
(20)determine the evolution of the economy over time, given an initial value of spending. 
Clearly, the system can be described by means of a figure that is analogous to Figure 1, 
with  y  replacing  L  on the horizontal axis.  Hence, the economy jumps to a steady state 
that satisfies (20)and a steady-state no-arbitrage condition, 
that is analogous to (11). 
A  comparison  of  (10)-(11)and (20)-(21) establishes  the equivalence of the two 
reduced-form systems.  In the latter,  y  replaces  L,  a,  replaces  a,, and a  replaces  1/A. 
Clearly, all comparative static calculations that apply to one system also apply to the other. 
The following observations may clarify the similarities between the two approaches 
and the economic structures that they generate.  In both models, agents invest resources 
to acquire the exclusive ability to manufacture a new product. Moreover, the R&D activity 
generates unappropriable spillovers in both cases.  In the variety-based  growth model, 
the R&D externality is quite explicit. Each completed product development project lowers 
the cost  of  later R&D efforts.  In the quality-based model, the externality  is  implicit. 
When one improvement project succeeds, other researchers can quit their efforts to achieve 
that same innovation and begin to work on the next improvement.  In both instances we 
have assumed that by observing the results from one innovative success, researchers can 
learn scientific and engineering facts that are useful in their own research endeavours. 
This seems a natural and important characteristic of research and reflects the public good 
nature of technology as information. 
The two approaches do diverge, however, in their welfare implications.  Proceeding 
with the analysis of the variety-based growth model, we note that (17)implies'.' 
log u(t)=log E +log a +  yt(l/a  -I),  (22) 
15.  In writing (22)we assume without loss of generality that the initial number of ditferentiated products 
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which  is analogous to  (12). Equation (22) gives the growth  rate in  the variety-based 
model as g =  y(l/a -I).  Substituting (22)into (I),  we  obtain the welfare function 
which is comparable to (14). Now we  can maximize (23)subject to (20),and compare 
the resulting optimal y* to the market equilibrium y.  We  find in contrast to our earlier 
result,  that  whenever  the  optimal  rate  of  innovation  is  positive,  this  rate  exceeds 
the market  determined  rate  (see Romer  (1990) and Grossman  and Helpman  (1989b) 
for similar results).  The reason  is  as follows.  Each new  product initially  contributes 
(1  --a)~n""-~  to consumer surplus.  The marginal entrant inflicts an aggregate loss of 
profits of (1-a)E/an  on the n existing firms.  The marginal utility of income is an""'. 
Thus, the static consumer-surplus effect and the static business-stealing effect just offset 
one another.'"oreover,  both  of  these  effects  compound  similarly  over time.  What 
remains then is the intertemporal spillover effect whereby current technological advance 
reduces the cost of later R&D.  Therefore, the marginal innovation conveys a net positive 
externality in the variety-based growth model and equilibrium growth is always too slow. 
V.  RESOURCES  AND GROWTH 
We endeavour now to extend our model of  quality-based innovation in order to bring 
out  certain  features  of  the  growth  process  that  are  not  evident  from  a  one-factor, 
one-manufacturing-sector formulation.  Specifically, we study in this section the relation- 
ship between the growth rate and the size and composition of the resource base.  In the 
next section we examine the long-run pattern of trade in a two-country world economy. 
It should be apparent as we proceed, in view of our findings in the previous section, that 
similar results  apply to an appropriately  extended variant of  the variety-based  growth 
model. 
We add to the model of Section I1 a sector that produces a homogeneous product 
of  fixed quality.  This might be  a service sector, for example.  We  replace (1) with the 
augmented preferences, 
where y(t) represents consumption of the homogeneous product and u(f)is as before 
(see (2)).  Then consumers allocate at every point in time a share s of their spending to 
the vertically differentiated products and a share (1-s)  to the outside good y.  The time 
pattern of spending follows (7). 
We add as well a second primary  factor of production.  We  shall refer to the two 
factors as unskilled labour (L)and skilled labour (H). Let unit manufacturing costs of 
the vertically differentiated  products be  cx(wL,  w,)  and those of the outside good be 
cY(wL, w,),  where  wi denotes the reward  to input  i,  i = L, H.  The  cost  of  a unit  of 
innovative activity is given by  c,(wL,  w,). 
We  assume perfect  competition in  the market  of  the outside good  and Bertrand 
competition as before in the markets for the vertically differentiated  products.  Let the 
former good serve now as numeraire. Then we have in place of (8) the following pricing 
16. This property of the CES preferences was first noted by  Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). It does not extend 
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equations: 
PX  =AcX(~L,  wH); 
1= cy(w,,  wH). 
Factor market clearing requires 
where ai ( . ) represents the cost-minimizing input vector per unit of output for i = I, X,  Y, 
and X  and Y denote output quantities.  The input vectors are given by the gradients of 
the respective unit-cost functions.  Static equilibrium in the commodity market entails 
s/(l  -s) =PxXIPYY.  (28) 
Finally, the steady-state no-arbitrage condition reads (in place of (1  1)): 
As before, convergence to the steady state is immediate. 
We  wish  to explore the relationship between  the growth rate and the size of the 
resource base. A common feature of recent models of endogenous technological progress 
has been that larger economies grow faster (see Aghion and Howitt (1990), Romer (1990) 
and Grossman and Helpman (1990)). We shall show that this result depends critically 
on the general equilibrium structure of these models.  In general, only larger endowments 
of  factors that are used intensively in the growth-generating activities  guarantee faster 
growth. 
To make this point, we pursue the special case in which R&D and manufacturing 
of  X  use only skilled labour while production of  the outside good uses both  primary 
factors.  With this restriction, we can combine (25)-(28) to obtain 
where a,,  is the skilled labour required for a unit of R&D activity,  Y(.) is the profit- 
maximizing supply of the outside good, and Hy(.)  represents that sector's demand for 
skilled labour when it employs the entire unskilled labour force.  We combine (25)-(26) 
and (28)-(29) to obtain 
We plot these two equations as HH  and IIII, respectively,  in Figure 3. 
Now consider an increase in H.  This shifts the HH  curve up and to the left, while 
leaving IIIIunaffected. The new equilibrium involves more innovation and faster growth.'7 
Here we see that accumulation of the factor used intensively in R&D indeed is conducive 
to growth. 
When  L increases, both curves shift to the right.  The rate of  innovation grows if 
and only if  the rightward  shift of IIII from A exceeds the rightward shift of  HH.  This 
occurs when  the elasticity of  substitution between  skilled  and unskilled  labour in the 
17. The growth rate of a consumption index now is  si log h GROSSMAN  &  HELPMAN  QUALITY LADDERS 
production of the outside good is larger than one, but not when it is smaller than one." 
Intuitively, the outside good draws skilled labour away from R&D and X  due to an 
output effect, but releases skilled labour as w,  rises due to a substitution effect.  When 
the elasticity of substitution is large, the latter effect dominates and so more skilled labour 
finds itself employed in R&D in the new general equilibrium. 
A more striking result emerges from a different special case. Suppose all three sectors 
use the primary factors in fixed proportions, and that R&D makes the most intensive use 
of skilled labour, while the production of the outside good makes the least intensive use 
of this factor.  It is straightforward to show that, in these circumstances, an increase in 
the supply of unskilled  labour must  slow growth.  The general point is that a positive 
monotonic relationship between resource supplies and employment of those resources in 
the growth-generating activities exists only for certain general equilibrium structures. 
VI.  INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
In this section we show how quality ladders can be embedded in a model of international 
trade.  We use the two-factor, two-sector structure of Section V to explore the nature of 
a trading equilibrium and to examine the long-run pattern of trade when resources in 
each country are devoted to improving the quality of some products. 
To begin with, suppose that each vertically differentiated product must be manufac- 
tured in the country in which the most recent product improvement has taken place. That 
is, we rule out international licensing and multinational corporations for the moment.  In 
18. The rightward  shift  in Till is given  by  the change in  W,, that  leaves  Y(wH, L)/wH constant  as L 
increases.  The rightward shift in HH is larger or smaller than this as H, increases or decreases with L when 
Y(w,,  L)/wHis kept constant.  Using the condition for optimal H, (marginal product equals wage), we find 
that H, increases with  L when  Y(wH, L)/wH is constant if  and only if  8,  +  E,  > 1, where  O,,  is the share of 
H in the cost of producing  Y and E,  is the absolute value of the elasticity of the marginal product of skilled 
labour in  the  Y sector.  Since  0,  + E,  = 1 +E,(I - cr), where  E,  is  defined analogously  to  F,  and u is the 
elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled  labour in the production of the outside good, our claim 
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Figure 4 we draw a rectangle whose dimensions represent the aggregate world endowments 
of  H  and L.  If  there were  no country  borders,  then the equilibrium  would  be that 
described in Section V above.  We ask now whether an equilibrium with free trade can 
reproduce the essential features of that integrated equilibrium, despite the fact that factors 
now are restricted to stay within their countries of origin. 
The vector OQ*  in the figure represents the total employment of H and L in the 
activities of product improvement and manufacturing of X in the equilibrium of Section 
V  (henceforth, the "integrated  equilibrium").  This vector is given by  a,L +a,X.  The 
vector Q*O* similarly represents employment in the production of the outside good in 
the integrated equilibrium.  We depict the endowments of the two countries by a point 
in the rectangle, with the vector of factors measured from the origin at 0 representing 
the  endowment of  the  home country and that  measured  from  0* representing  the 
endowment of the foreign country.  We claim that if the endowment point, marked E, 
falls within the parallelogram  OQO*Q*, then there exists a trading equilibrium with all 
aggregate variables identical to those of the integrated equilibrium. 
At E, the home country is relatively well-endowed with skilled labour. Suppose that 
factor prices and interest rates in the two countries were equalized nonetheless and that 
their levels were the same as  in the integrated equilibrium.'9 Then techniques of production 
would be the same.  The home country achieves full employment if it employs OP in the 
combined activity of  product improvement  and manufacturing of  X  and OP,  in the 
production of outside goods. Full employment obtains abroad when that country employs 
O*P* in the combined activity and O*P$ in manufacturing of  Y. These employment 
vectors give the same aggregate levels of activity as in the integrated equilibrium.  The 
ratio of the line segments  OPIOQ gives the number of  n  of  vertically differentiated 
products that is produced  at home.  The home country also performs  a fraction  n  of 
world R&D activity, and thereby maintains leadership in a measure n  of products in all 
19.  International  trade  in  financial  assets  would  of  course  guarantee  equalization  of  interest  rates. 
However, as we shall see, a steady-state equilibrium exists with identical interest rates in the two countries even 
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periods.20 The foreign country produces the remaining n* = 1-n vertically differentiated 
products and undertakes the fraction n*  of R&D effort. 
It remains to be  shown only that, with the proposed  allocations, product markets 
clear and all profitability conditions are satisfied.  Since we  have provisionally assumed 
that all factor prices are the same as they were in the integrated equilibrium, all activities 
break  even in  each country, as they  all  did in  the integrated equilibrium.  Also,  with 
interest rates as before, the no-arbitrage condition continues to be satisfied in each country. 
With the same costs of production, commodity prices are the same as in the integrated 
equilibrium.  Aggregate  world  income  is  the  same  as  well.  Since  preferences  are 
homothetic, the distribution  of  income  does not matter for aggregate demand, and so 
product markets clear.  This completes our demonstration that commodity trade (with or 
without  trade  in  financial  assets)  suffices  to  reproduce  the  essential  features  of  the 
integrated steady-state equilibrium. 
What then is the pattern of world trade? Suppose, to begin with, that financial assets 
are not traded; i.e. each country must finance all R&D that takes place within its borders 
from  domestic  savings.  Then  the trade  account must  balance.  The homotheticity  of 
preferences implies an identical composition of aggregate demand in the two countries. 
But from Figure 4 we see that the unskilled-labour-abundant (foreign) country specializes 
relatively in the production of the unskilled-labour-intensive (outside) good.  Hence, the 
home country imports the outside good.  With trade balanced, this country must be a net 
exporter of vertically differentiated  products.  This pattern  of  intersectoral trade corre- 
sponds of course to the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin  model.  Here it applies to 
the steady state of a dynamic world economy with continual quality-upgrading. 
The two-country world  economy does not converge immediately to a steady state, 
unless the initial ownership shares in blueprints for frontier products happen to coincide 
with the n and n*  of the steady-state equilibrium.  In general, these shares are attained 
during a phase of  dynamic adjustment.  If international trade in financial assets takes 
place along the adjustment path, then typically the steady state will not be characterized 
by  balanced  trade.  Although  the  production  patterns  of  the  steady  state  remain  as 
described above, it may happen that one country will import both the outside good and 
(on net)  vertically  differentiated  products.  It  can  do so if  its  steady-state surplus on 
service  account is large enough.  Trade imbalance cannot reverse the pattern  of  trade 
from that predicted by the Heckscher-Ohlin  theorem, however. 
Finally, we relax the assumption that product improvement and manufacturing of 
the improved product must take place in the same location.  For endowment points in 
OQO*Q* of Figure 4 firms have no incentive to separate these activities, because profit 
opportunities are the  same in  every  country.  We  have  seen that the world  economy 
reproduces the integrated equilibrium under these circumstances.  But commodity trade 
alone is not sufficient to reproduce the integrated equilibrium for endowments outside 
OQO*Q*. Then, if product improvement and the manufacturing of vertically differenti- 
ated products use H and L in different proportions, there may be an incentive for firms 
to separate geographically their research and production operations. Assume for concrete- 
ness that at common factor prices R&D employs relatively more skilled labour than does 
manufacturing.  Let  OD and DQ  be  the  employment  vectors  in  these two  activities, 
20.  Entrepreneurs in the home country might, for example, be the only ones who attempt to improve a 
fraction  n  of  the products,  each at intensity  L.  Or home entrepreneurs may  attempt to improve the entire 
spectrum of vertically differentiated products at intensity nl. Other allocations are possible as well, so long as 
the aggregate innovation  effort  devoted  to each  product  w  is  the same and equal  to  L  from the integrated 
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respectively, in the integrated equilibrium.  Following Grossman and Helpman (1989c), 
it is easy to show that, for endowment points inside the triangle ODQ, the quantities of 
the integrated equilibrium again can be reproduced by commodity trade when a suitable 
number of multinational corporations form.  These multinationals conduct their R&D at 
home, but undertake their subsequent manufacturing in the foreign country.  For some 
endowment points outside ODQ (and the symmetrically placed triangle on the opposite 
side of the diagonal) there will also be an incentive for multinationals to emerge.  But, 
in these cases, the trade equilibrium with  multinationals differs  non-trivially from the 
integrated equilibrium. 
VII.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
We have developed a model of on-going product improvements. This model draws several 
building blocks  from earlier work by  Segerstrom  et al. (1990) and Aghion and Howitt 
(1990).  Entrepreneurs  race to bring out the next generation of  a continuum of goods. 
In each industry success occurs with a probability per unit time that is proportional to 
the total  R&D resources targeted to improving that product.  Each product  follows a 
stochastic progression up the quality ladder.  But the equilibrium is characterized by an 
aggregate rate of innovation that is determinate, and constant in the steady state. 
The model  captures  many  realistic  aspects of the innovation  process.  Individual 
products become obsolete after a time.  Progress is not uniform across sectors.  Research 
responds  to profit  incentives.  And  innovators  are able to benefit from observing  and 
analysing the research successes of their rivals.  These features fit the detailed historical 
descriptions of industrial R&D provided by Freeman (1982) and others. 
We related our approach to an alternative one that treats industrial R&D as a process 
of creating an ever-expanding range of horizontally differentiated  products.  The latter 
framework has been applied to issues of long-run technological progress and growth by 
Romer (1989) and ourselves (1989a, b, 1990). We showed that the two approaches though 
seemingly quite distinct actually share identical reduced forms for their simplest variants. 
Thus, both  approaches yield  the same answers  to many  positive  questions about the 
determinants of the long-run growth rate.  However, as Aghion and Howitt pointed out, 
the normative analyses of the variety-based and quality-based growth models differ.  In 
the former, the  equilibrium rate of  innovation  always  is too slow.  But  when  growth 
derives from product improvements, it may be slower or faster than is optimal.  We have 
been  able to derive  and contrast these  results  using  very  comparable versions of  the 
alternative models. 
In one section of this paper, we cast the innovation process in a two-country setting. 
We described a long-run equilibrium with  product improvements taking place in each 
country, with  intra-industry trade in  vertically differentiated  products,  and with  inter- 
industry trade of technologically progressive goods for homogeneous, unchanging goods. 
The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem predicts the long-run pattern of intersectoral trade despite 
the diversion of resources and to R&D and the continual technological advance that takes 
place. 
Building on the framework developed here, we provide a richer story of international 
trade  in  a  companion  paper  (Grossman  and  Helpman  (1989d).  There,  all  product 
improvements take place in  a high-wage region  with  comparative advantage in  R&D. 
But entrepreneurs in the low-wage region are able to produce clones of state-of-the-art 
products  if  they  succeed  in  reverse  engineering.  Imitation,  like  innovation,  requires 
resources and entails uncertain prospects.  Unlike earlier models of the product life cycle GROSSMAN  &  HELPMAN  QUALITY  LADDERS 
based on horizontally differentiated  products (e.g. Krugman  (1979) or Grossman  and 
Helpman (1989a)), this one predicts that the locus of output of a particular type of good 
will move back and forth between the North and the South as the former region captures 
market share when quality improvements take place and the latter then begins the process 
of  imitating the new,  improved product.  This description of the product  cycle would 
seem apt for many industries; e.g. personal computers and many consumer electronics. 
We believe that our model is rich in its predictions, yet technically quite manageable. 
It might gainfully be extended to include endogenous accumulation of primary factors. 
We hope that it will prove useful in application to additional issues concerning innovation 
and long-run growth. 
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